



Campaign Plans, Military Strategy, and Policy Objectives: The Imperiative for Linkage in U.S. Defense Planning

by

Major Douglas D. Brisson
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

18 May 1988

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION School of Advanced Military Studies, USAC&GSC 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ATZL-SWV	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)
Campaign Plans, Military Strategy, and Policy Objectives: The Imperative for Linkage in U.S. Defense Planning (U)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
MAJ Douglas D. Brisson, USA

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Monograph	FROM _____ TO _____	88/5/18	51

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
Cont'd from pg B

17. COSATI CODES		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
campaign plans; military strategy; national strategy; Defense planning; DOD reform; strategic planning; NSC; strategy integration; operational art

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

This monograph identifies a void in the strategic planning process of the United States and proposes a modified national security decisionmaking and implementation structure to improve the ability of the U.S. to integrate the elements of national power. The modification creates regional orgranizations called Regional Security Staffs headed by Assistant National Security Advisors that directly support the President and the National Security Council in devising regional sub-strategies to enhance the accomplishment of U.S. global strategy. The Assistant National Security Advisor exercises "integrative" authority to cut across functional lines within the region.

The importance of this modification is twofold. First, a survey of strategic planning done within the monograph reveals that there are certain elements of successful strategic planning. The survey examines why successful campaigns do not always lead to victory in war. The key is that strategic planning provides the link between policy, strategy, and campaigns by planning the integration of national power. The survey discusses how the U.S. has been unsuccessful in this area since the end of World War II despite the creation of the NSC. Second, the NSC

20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
☐ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS	UNCLASSIFIED

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
MAJ Douglas D. Brisson	(913) 684-3437	ATZL-SWV

Block 19 continued:

currently relies on functional lines to implement but has no way of ensuring integration of all elements of power. This is due in large measure to the proliferatin of regional responsibilities and interests of the U.S.

The monograph derives eight essential elements of strategic planning from the historical survey and demonstrates how the modification proposed meets these imperatives. The proposal is then tested against the criteria of suitability, feasibility, flexibility, and acceptability to determine its utility. In conclusion, the paper covers the current disarray in U.S. strategic planning and discusses how planning, force structure, and budgeting would be affected in a positive manner by the proposed modification.

Campaign Plans, Military Strategy, and Policy Objectives: The Imperiative for Linkage in U.S. Defense Planning

by

Major Douglas D. Brisson
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

18 May 1988

School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph Approval

Name of Student: Major Douglas D. Brisson
Title of Monograph: Campaign Plans, Military Strategy, and Policy Objectives: The Imperative for Linkage in U.S. Defense Planning

Approved by:

James R McDonough
Lieutenant Colonel James R. McDonough, M.S. — Monograph Director

L. D. Holder
Colonel L. D. Holder, M.A. — Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes
Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D. — Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Accepted this 26th day of May 1988.

ABSTRACT

CAMPAIGN PLANS, MILITARY STRATEGY, AND POLICY OBJECTIVES: THE IMPERATIVE FOR LINKAGE IN U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING by MAJ Douglas D. Brisson, USA, 51 pages.

This monograph identifies a void in the strategic planning process of the United States and proposes a modified national security decisionmaking and implementation structure to improve the ability the U.S. to integrate the elements of national power. The modification creates regional organizations called Regional Security Staffs headed by Assistant National Security Advisors that directly support the President and the National Security Council in devising regional sub-strategies to enhance the accomplishment of U.S. global strategy. The Assistant National Security Advisor exercises "integrative" authority to cut across functional lines within the region.

The importance of this modification is twofold. First, a survey of strategic planning done within the monograph reveals that there are certain elements of successful strategic planning. The survey examines why successful campaigns do not always lead to victory in war. The key is that strategic planning provides the link between policy, strategy, and campaigns by planning the integration of national power. The survey discusses how the U.S. has been unsuccessful in this area since the end of World War II despite the creation of the NSC. Second, the NSC currently relies on functional lines to implement but has no way of ensuring integration of all elements of power. This is due in large measure to the proliferation of regional responsibilities and interests of the U.S.

The monograph derives eight essential elements of strategic planning from the historical survey and demonstrates how the modification proposed meets these imperatives. The proposal is then tested against the criteria of suitability, feasibility, flexibility, and acceptability to determine its utility. In conclusion, the paper covers the current disarray in U.S. strategic planning and discusses how planning, force structure, and budgeting would be affected in a positive manner by the proposed modification.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The direction of defense planning in the United States in recent years has been affected by two related developments. The first is the "rediscovery" of the operational level of war by the U.S. Army.[1] The second is the focus on the reorganization and reform of the Defense Department.[2] The former has been predominately an internal effort, while the latter has, for the most part, been imposed on the services by external forces. The common linkage between both developments, however, is that each reflects a concern that the American military lacked something essential to win America's wars.

This concern, although sharpened by contemporary examples such as Desert One and Grenada, has its roots in the Vietnam War. There has been a deep wound to the prestige of the nation and the armed forces for having "lost" the war. Thus, as the Army refocused on the European environment, it reexamined the fundamentals of war to ensure "winning the first battle of the next war." This period of retrenchment witnessed the transition from a doctrine of Active Defense to the current AirLand Battle.[3] Central to the new doctrine was the reemergence of the concept of the operational level of war and the need for campaign plans. Carl von Clausewitz' long neglected tome On War was dusted off and found to contain the theoretical explanation for what had gone wrong; or at least, that was Colonel Harry Summers' fundamental premise in his book about the Vietnam War, On Strategy.[4]

The Army's introspection was matched by a spate of external attacks on the U.S. military in general that questioned its ability.[5] The conclusion was that the structure of the defense establishment was not conducive to planning or operating in the joint environment. The triumph of this reasoning was the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act

which sought to make the Joint Staff stronger and force the services to think and act "joint."[6]

But the reformers' zeal should be tempered by the observation by a North Vietnamese officer to Colonel Summers that it was irrelevant that the U.S. had not been beaten on the battlefield. The remark underscorces the fundamental flaw in focusing solely on reforming the military in an effort to win the next time.[7] Victory in war is not simply the sum of battles won in isolation, but rather the product achieved by connecting expertly the various elements of strategy. Successful campaigns displaying splendid use of joint operations may be worthy of academic analysis of operational art, but they contribute little to winning wars if they are not integrated into a strategy that is aimed at solving the real strategic problem.

Therefore, despite the positive impact these approaches have had on the American military's ability to wage war, both fail to attack the central problem. The fundamental issue is the ability of the nation to identify correctly the strategic problem and to link policy, strategy, and campaign plans to solving that problem. The essence of strategic planning is the integration of the elements of national power to this end.

Clausewitz acknowledged that war in its absolute form was only a theoretical concept and that in reality many other factors influenced the outcome of a war besides a pure application of violence.[8] Although this relationship of the elements of national power has always been true to one degree or another, it has been especially true for the United States in the period since World War II when the U.S. became a global power, and the pre-war organization of the government along functional lines for national security decisionmaking was no longer adequate for a nation with multi-region interests. In a era

characterized by limited war, cold war, low-intensity conflict, and terrorism, the U.S. government has struggled to apply power in various combinations to achieve its national objectives. What is essential, therefore, is a national security decisionmaking structure that enhances the nation's ability to select and implement the best possible strategy.

The National Security Council would seem to be the likely forum for this activity. Unfortunately, this structure does not contribute to the successful application of all the elements of national power. The implementation of NSC decisions occurs within functional lines, while integration relies on interagency committees or ad hoc crisis action teams. There are several weaknesses in this approach. First, the personalities involved are not working with each other on a regular basis. Second, there are no clear procedures governing the interface of the agencies represented. Third, these groups are managerial and/or information conduits rather than decision makers. Fourth, they tend to be forums designed to reach compromise among the contending views. Finally, there is no unified structure with "integrative" authority to implement the decisions of the NSC.

The reality is that the NSC, although intended to act as the "integrative" overseer of this process, has become increasingly overwhelmed by events. The multi-regional interests of the U.S. and the variety of threats severely limits the ability of the NSC to perform this function. A typical week for the NSC could include a hijacking, a naval confrontation, a revolution in a friendly Third World country, war in the Middle East, travels of the Secretary of State to Moscow and Brussels, summit prepartion and arms control negotiations to name a few. Nor does this include the other normal requirements.

In contrast, the doctrine of combined arms warfare has become an essential aspect of military training and force structure in the 20th century.[9] The U.S. military has so wedded itself to the concept that a case could be made that in fact it has de facto become another principle of war. Its importance is manifest in the existence of the unified commands and recognized in the title of AirLand Battle doctrine. While the military's unified commands provide a structure for the use of military power that cuts across functional lines to overcome service parochialism and address the regional nature of threats to U.S. interests, there is no comparable structure at the national level to integrate the various elements of national power.

The purpose of this paper is to present a modified U.S. national security structure that addresses the integration of the elements of national power in order to implement national strategy more effectively. The discussion will begin with an historical analysis that will trace the evolution of strategic planning in order to derive elements common to succussful strategic planning. The survey will begin in the Napoleonic period and end with the Vietnam war. Following the identification of those elements, the proposed modification will be described. In order to test the validity of this paradigm, it will be measured against four criteria: 1)suitability--does it achieve the desired effect?-- 2)feasibility--does it have a reasonable chance of working?-- 3)flexibility--can it apply across the spectrum of conflict and to changes in the global and/or regional security interests of the United States?--and 4)acceptability--is the structure acceptable to our political system, structure of government, and values? Finally, the paper will discuss the implications of the paradigm for current U.S. defense planning.[10]

CAMPAIGNS AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Campaigns are meant to achieve strategic objectives which in turn reflect political objectives. So, in a sense, campaigns are a link between the operational and strategic levels of war. Therefore, it is logical to assume that a successful campaign would contribute to a successful outcome of a war. However, when this test is applied to many campaigns over the past two centuries, the result does not hold true. This incongruity suggests a survey of selected campaigns within their strategic context in order to identify those elements of successful strategic planning. It is not my purpose here to analyze any campaign as much as to examine the end result.

The Napoleonic Period

The campaigns of Napoleon arguably represent the starting point for the study of the evolution of operational art.[11] Nevertheless, despite numerous successful campaigns, Napoleon repeatedly experienced battlefied deja vu, having to defeat the same enemy or coalition over and over again. Thus, merely defeating the enemy in a climactic battle at the end of a campaign and forcing him to sue for peace, while temporarily ending the war, did not resolve the conflict. Napoleon's campaigns failed to focus on solving France's real strategic problem: Britain.

The British were committed to preventing the French from consolidating power on the continent. However, with her reliance on seapower to protect the home islands as well as her colonies, Britain was not prepared to defeat Napoleon's Grand Army unilaterally in pitched battle on the continent. Allies were necessary. With British naval superiority--especially after Trafalgar, British money (thanks to the resources of the colonies), and some British soldiers,

Napoleon's continental foes continued to rise from the ashes.[12]

Three campaigns serve to illustrate the problem. The first is Austerlitz. Although this battle was a great victory for the Napoleonic method of warfare, it is less significant than Napoleon's abandoning his planned invasion of Britain in order to defeat the revived coalition.[13] The second campaign is the struggle in the Iberian peninusla. Here, French soldiers were wasted in costly battles that even if successful would not have destroyed Wellington's army nor have touched British seapower. Finally, the campaign against Russia in 1812 is often seen as futile and the beginning of the end for Bonaparte. As dramatic as the outcome of the campaign was both in its immediate and long term effects, once again its significance lies in its purpose. Although Franco-Russian relations had deteriorated gradually since the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, Alexander I's decision to evade the strictures of the Continental System--Napoleon's embargo on trade with Britain--compelled Bonaparte to invade Russia to preempt an Anglo-Russian alliance.[14]

Napoleon, in his triple role of soldier-statesman-emperor, had the necessary control over his strategic plans to choose between eliminating potential British allies permanently or devising a plan to defeat the British Navy. His brillance as a campaigner, however, did not extend to his strategic vision. He continued to expand his conquests through a series of successful campaigns that were not linked by a strategic focus toward solving the real source of France's adversity. The result was to create a strategic situation that wore France down while raising the stakes in each subsequent campaign. Amazingly, this series of events is not unlike what happened with Nazi Germany's military campaigns in World War II.

The American Civil War

It is interesting to speculate what Napoleon or his great interpreter Jomini would have done with armies equipped with rifled muskets, telegraphs, and railroads. One would hope that tactics would have changed as well as operational maneuver since Napoleon's hallmark was his genius at employing the technology of the day better than his opponents. Although the United States entered its civil war equipped with such technology, the tactics of the opposing sides would not have been unfamiliar to the marshals at Waterloo. This dichotomy between new technology and tactics based on outmoded weapons was the reason for much of the slaughter that ensued.

Another contrast is found in the forms of government. Unlike Napoleon who was soldier become emperor, the adversaries in the Civil War were products of a democratic system that honored the primacy of civilian leadership. The strategic leadership on both sides resided in the government and not in the generals (although there were some, such as McClellan--to mention a more notorious example, who attempted to use politics to manipulate the system).

The South, though inferior in population and industry, had the advantage of interior lines, tremendous popular support, and apolitical generals who were excellent tactical and operational commanders. Its great weakness lay in a lack of strategic vision. There was no unifying strategic plan or direction other than a concept of defense that ceded the initiative to the North.

The North, on the other hand, had tremendous material advantages, to include virtual control of the sea, but was hamstrung by having to operate on exterior lines and to form an army virtually from scratch--much of the prewar leadership deciding to fight for the Confederacy. Northern generals proved no match for their Southern counterparts in

operational maneuver, although the tactical gap closed during the war. The great advantage the North did have was a strong president who provided strategic direction and perseverance. Once Lincoln found in Ulysses Grant a general capable of beating Robert E. Lee, the slim chances of the South disappeared.

The contrasting campaigns of the two sides reflect the disparity in strategic planning. As mentioned, Southern strategy was predominately defensive and reactive. The ill-fated campaigns into Tennessee and Kentucky by Bragg, even had they been successful, would have affected the North's war effort only marginally. Lee's campaigns into Maryland and Pennsylvania in 1862 and 1863 sought to create a decisive battle on Northern territory with the hope that victory would bring Britain into the war on the side of the Confederacy. Despite whatever operational or tactical conditions led to their failure, both campaigns were developed in isolation from other Confederate armies.[15] The defeat of the Army of the Potomac would only have succeeded strategically if it precipitated certain political and diplomatic events.

The overall Northern strategy was to divide the South into small segments while blockading the coast and occupying the ports. Coupled with this dismemberment and strangulation would be the isolation and defeat of the separate Confederate field armies and the occupation of its capital and major population centers. Despite operating on exterior lines, the impact was synergistic. Furthermore, the use of rail and telegraph allowed a level of command and control from Washington that helped focus the superior resources of the North more quickly than the South could react. In short, Northern strategy focused on economic, political, and military objectives all tied to a cause that would help maintain popular support.

The German Period, 1858-1918

German history has become synonymous with war; yet, the period briefly examined here is rich in its display of the interaction between military planning and foreign policy. The development of this relationship separates into three distinct phases.[16]

The first phase encompasses the years from Moltke the Elder's ascension to the post of Chief of the Prussian General Staff until the end of the Franco-Pussian War. During these years, Otto von Bismarck came to power in the midst of a constitutional struggle between the monarch and the Reichstag over budgetary control of the army. Prussia's strategic problem was its rivalry with Austria-Hungary for the leadership of the north German states. During the campaigns against Austria-Hungary in 1866 and France in 1870-71, Bismarck came into conflict with Moltke over the jurisdiction of politics over military operations. It was a testament to the power of Bismarck's personality and will, as well as Moltke's wisdom, that the primacy of politics prevailed.

The modus vivendi established between Bismarck and Moltke govern the course of strategic planning in the second phase, 1871-1890. Thoughout this phase, Moltke's plans reflected the shifts and nuances of Bismarckian diplomacy. Having unified northern Germany under Prussian hegemony, Bismarck and Moltke faced the strategic problem of a two-front war. Bismarck dealt with the problem by striving to prevent the formation of alliances hostile to Germany while simultaneously isolating France. The formation of the Three Emperor's League between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in late 1873 was a step toward this end.

At the same time, Moltke devised mobilization war plans that focused on a variety of contingencies. Plans were developed for war

against France and its potential allies, such as Russia and Austria, in the period immediately after the Franco-Prussian War.[17] The plans focused on mobilization only against France, or France and Austria, during the period of positive relations with Russia. After 1875, however, the plans focused increasingly on defeating Russia first. The expansion of the Russian Army and Germany's entrance into the Dual Alliance with Austria engendered the prospect of war with Russia while holding France at bay.[18]

The harmony in German strategic planning between military plans and foreign policy began to erode after 1887 with Moltke's death and succession by Count Waldersee. Waldersee desired a preventative war against Russia (France's internal politcal crisis at the time effectively assuring its non-intervention).[19] Bismarck managed to block him by negotiating the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and by forbidding combined planning between the Austrian and German General Staffs.[20] It was virtually his last act, since the young Kaiser Wilhelm II removed him from office in 1890.

The third phase, 1891-1981, witnessed the complete collapse of the Bismarckian system as military plans became axiomatic, divorcing themselves from specific political objectives or foreign policy initiatives. This trend culminated in the reversal of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is an extension of politics. By the end of this period, policy existed to support war. The success of German foreign policy depended on flexibility. Nevertheless, after 1890, war plans became increasingly rigid, thereby decreasing the options available to support policy until the technical imperatives of mobilization eliminated political freedom of maneuver.

Looking across these 60 years, several salient features emerge. First and foremost is the impact of two dominant personalities who

were geniuses in their respective areas. It is important to remember that German strategic planning did not take place in a vacuum of mobilization schemes or diplomacy and treaties. Domestic politics assumed a great role in shaping events. Much of Bismarck's energy was spent in budgetary battles with the Reichstag that directly affected the peacetime active duty strength of the army as well as its mobilization potential.[21]

A second element is the continuity of planning; the first half of the period had one monarch, one Chancellor, and one Chief of the General Staff. From 1890 on, the only continuity was the new monarch, a weak-willed man of dubious capacity or vision. Related to continuity is the third element: the effective integration of the elements of power to create conditions that either helped prevent war or ensured its prosecution on the most favorable terms. A fourth factor is a force structured consistent with its intended use. Finally, but very important, is the recognition (during the earlier years) of Germany's central strategic concern even as that concern changed.

Symptomatic of the loss of vision after 1890 were the decision to build the High Seas Fleet and the increasing reliance on a single mobilization/war plan. The naval effort siphoned resources away from the army and antagonized and frightened Britain. In the crucial battles on the Marne in 1914, the fleet did nothing to aid the battle, but the presence of the BEF--a presence inspired in part by the creation of the High Seas Fleet--was vital. The absence of additional German corps that might have been formed with resources devoted to the Navy, on the other hand, was sorely felt at the First Battle of the Marne.[22] After Count Alfred von Schlieffen became Chief of the General Staff and revised the plan to defeat France, the General Staff

did little to update the alternate plan to mobilize against Russia. Eventually, the latter plan fell from exercises altogether.[23] Thus, the stage was set for the traumatic scene between the Kaiser and Moltke the Younger as the general broke into tears at his monarch's suggestion to change the direction of the mobilization.[24] The fine scapel honed by the elder Moltke and used by the great surgeon Bismarck had become a club wielded by a blind giant.

World War II--Germany

The military campaigns of Nazi Germany leave one simultaneously awed and bewildered. As with the Napoleonic campaigns, there was much success initially, but a decreasing ability to win as the consequences of poor strategic planning began to take their toll. The pivotal role of the campaigns against Russia in each instance provoke the inevitable comparison. The central problem for Nazi Germany was that its tremendous operational ability could carry Germany only so far in the face of a flawed strategic concept.

Adolf Hitler provided Germany a strong willed leader who had the goal of overturning the Versailles Treaty and reunifying Greater Germany. Its driving element was the concept of Lebensraum, the need for Germany to expand in order to survive, to progress, and, finally, to dominate. Hitler proved to be a master of diplomatic intimidation in achieving many of his early goals without war. However, as he was forced to turn increasingly to military solutions, his genius faded along with his trust in his general staff.[25] Drunk with success, Germany flung her military might widely, but with no strategic direction. Before one campaign climaxed, another ensued.

The campaigns against France, Russia, and Britain (in North Africa) illustrate the abandonment of a strategy, the essence of which was, ironically, the avoidance of a multifront war. Prior to invading

Poland in 1939, Hitler, in a coup that Bismarck would have applauded, negotiated a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.[26] This treaty provided the strategic backdrop the following year for the Fall Gelb plan for the defeat of France and Britain in the West while Germany's rear was secure. However, the benefit of this treaty was voided when Hitler decided to turn east against the Soviet Union before forcing Britain out of the war in the west. Similarly, the decision to send Rommel to North Africa to prop up Italian forces led to a commitment of forces and resources that contributed little to winning the war despite Rommel's brillant operations.[27]

The notable observation about Germany's strategy and campaign plans is that successful campaigns led Germany even further into a multifront war rather than permitting a concentration of power in one theater of war at a time. It is a safe bet the German generals on the Eastern front would have preferred to have had the divisions, aircraft, and other resources that were tied up elsewhere because of the failure to defeat Britain.

Another failure of Germany was a lack of unified military doctrine. The power bases of the leadership below Hitler produced competition for resources instead of a common vision of how to structure the Wehrmacht for war. In many respects, this is not surprising given the absence of coherent strategic concept. Nevertheless, a few examples will suffice. The Luftwaffe was designed as a tactical and, at best, operational service. There were no strategic bombers. But as the war progressed the opportunity to use strategic bombing increased.[28] Within the army, the debate raged over whether to build tanks or assault guns. Each had its advantages, but the shift back and forth on the production lines from one type to another lowered the number produced. Finally, the presence of three

different ground forces, each with its own chain of command, organization, equipment priorities and standards--the Wehrmacht, the SS, and the Luftwaffe--did not contribute efficiently to the war effort.[29]

World War II--The United States

Despite its foray into the morass of European affairs during World War I and its aftermath, the United States, though certainly having global interests, was not a global power prior to World War II. The American Army was small and the size of the Navy was the focus of concern as witnessed by the Washington Naval Treaty signed by the U.S., Britain, France, Japan, and Italy in 1921.[30] However, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, forward thinking professional military officers sought to use the lessons gleaned from our precipitate entry into World War I as a basis for reorganizing the defense establishment and planning for future conflict.[31]

On the eve of America's entry into World War II, therefore, joint war planning was ready for the crisis. During the interwar years, planners had considered a variety of plans that covered possible war scenarios. At first these plans were color coded, envisioning potential enemies, at least initially on the basis of individual or combined naval strength. However, in 1939 the Army-Navy Joint Board directed the Joint Planning Committee(JPC) to develop a series of strategic concepts to provide the basis for a new set of war plans. Eventually, five strategic concepts were adopted and the JPC ordered to design plans which later became known as the Rainbow Plans.[32]

At about the same time that work began on the Rainbow Plans, President Roosevelt ordered the Joint Board and the JPC under his direct control in the Executive Department, removing them from control by the service secretaries. This highly significant act signalled

Roosevelt's intent to exercise his prerogative as Commander in Chief by intimately supervising strategic planning.[33]

Roosevelt's background as Secretary of the Navy had helped sharpen his strategic vision. He saw the strategic dilemma for the U.S. as a simultaneous war in Europe and the Pacific. As early as 1937, after the sinking of the U.S. gunboat Panay, Roosevelt directed initial naval contacts with Britain in anticipation of war with Japan.[34] He recognized the imperative for preparing for war with all the elements of power. Thus, he supported the adoption of Selective Service to prepare manpower; and he used the guise of Lend Lease to begin preliminary mobilization of the U.S. industrial base while helping to keep Britain in the war--this latter goal seen as imperative to America's successful prosecution of the war once it had entered.[35]

The decision to defeat Germany first, the basis of Rainbow 5, was difficult to stand by in the face of popular sentiment against Japan after Pearl Harbor. Nonetheless, Roosevelt persisted and hastened to get American ground troops into action against Germany, supporting the plan to invade North Africa in late 1942. This compromise aimed at accommodating British views against an early cross-channel invasion and the Russian demand for an immediate second front.[36]

Roosevelt's chief military advisor, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, strongly supported Operation SLEDGEHAMMER, the plan for a cross-channel attack in late 1942. He argued against the peripheral strategy in general and against operations in the Mediterranean in specific. This course of action, he argued, would dissipate efforts to build up forces in Britain for the main operation thereby postponing it. By July 1942, Marshall questioned the wisdom of operations in a theater where the Germans continued to display success.[37] In the end, Roosevelt ordered the go ahead for Operation TORCH; America's first

campaign against Germany would be in North Africa. Although there is ample room for disagreement with the decision to invade North Africa, Operation TORCH was consistent with the strategic concept approved by Roosevelt in Rainbow 5. Whatever political considerations may have influenced him, Roosevelt did not waiver from his vision of prosecution of the war.

This consistency is relevant when considering apparent anomalies in the prosecution of the war in the Pacific as well. One criticism of Pacific operations has been that the United States never assumed the strategic defense planned for in Rainbow 5. Even if correct, the question remains as to whether the operations there violated the principle of Germany first? The overall weight of effort was against Germany. Bold plans executed with meager forces achieving startling tactical successes with far-reaching operational impact allowed the Allies to shift to the offensive in the Pacific in late 1942 despite it remaining a strategic secondary theater. Another criticism is the lack of focus in the Pacific campaign. MacArthur's drive toward the Philippines, the argument holds, weakened the main effort being pursued by the Navy in its drive across the central Pacific. However, Roosevelt, for political reasons, was willing to entertain dual attacks on Japan's outposts as long as the result conformed to his strategic vision.[38]

The key features of America's strategic planning efforts leading up to and through World War II are fivefold. First, there is the impact of dominant personalities, Roosevelt and Marshall in particular. Next, the long time period each held his respective position permitted them to initiate and see programs through to fruition while making necessary alterations along the way. Third, the planning agency, the JPC, was brought directly under Presidential

control which helped to ensure that military war plans as well as campaign plans were consistent with the President's strategic vision. Fourth, the plans developed by the JPC represented unrestrained thinking at the strategic level. Plans were predicated upon a strategic concept for achieving victory, not upon existing forces or presumed restrictions. Finally, Roosevelt's prewar decisions reflected his acute awareness of the interrelationship between the elements of power. He knew strategic vision meant little if the economic, social, and political foundation was not prepared.[39]

The Korean War

American involvement in the Korean War stands in marked contrast to that in World War II. While it was a conventional war at the front, it was fought in the shadow of nuclear weapons, under the aegis of the containment doctrine espoused in NSC 68, and against the backdrop of U.S. fears about potential Soviet moves against Western Europe. While World War II had been anticipated and planned for with strategic vision, the Korean conflict was unanticipated, unplanned for, and certainly outside the strategic vision reflected by Dean Acheson's definition of the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia.[40]

The irony in this situation was the fact that the National Security Act of 1947 as amended in 1949 had attempted to place into practice, with the formation of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the de jure adoption of the JCS to provide strategic guidance, the best aspects of the defense structure that had led to victory in World War II. Moreover, the act sought "to coordinate the economic, military, political, and psychological power of the United States and direct those enormous energies to the fulfillment of its new responsibilities for freeworld leadership." [41]

The strategic problem for the United States during the Korean War

was not North Korea; it was the Soviet Union. Not that Red China was of no immediate concern in theater, but the United States saw its vital interests in Western Europe, which Russia, not China, threatened. So in a strategic sense Korea was a limited war that the United States did not want to see escalate into conflict with the Soviet Union. This concern decidedly affected the course of the war.

The campaign plan had to reflect these concerns since it was the military expression of policy objectives. Within two weeks of North Korea's invasion, General MacArthur had decided on an amphibious turning movement as the operational design to defeat the enemy quickly and decisively.[42] Despite his sureness of vision, he encountered resistance from virtually everyone involved, to include the JCS who at one point had decided to override his decision.[43] By sheer force of personality, MacArthur prevailed; the Inchon landing was executed with dramatic success. At this point, the U.S. effort began to break down.

Having successfully defeated the North Korean army, the United States now faced a decision: go north and occupy all the enemy country, or merely restore the prewar border. The strategic vision from the NCA through the JCS was hardly crystal clear.[44] Given a tenuous approval to go north, MacArthur, in the absence of firm guidance, began to conduct a pursuit. With Chinese intervention far from improbable, MacArthur's actions risked expanding if not escalating the war. The JCS and the NCA, however, abrogated their responsibility to ensure that the operational design conformed to a coherent strategic concept.

The result of this path was MacArthur's removal by President Truman. MacArthur had acted to fill the void left by the absence of a strategic design for the war. For MacArthur there was no subsitute for victory, that is victory in traditional terms. Sadly, the old

warrior did not understand the meaning of victory in limited war. Tragically, the mechanism established at the national level could not define it either.

When General Matthew Ridgway replaced MacArthur, strategic guidance did not improve. Consequently, Ridgway focused on tactics and restoration the fighting spirit of United Nations forces. The war settled into attritional exchanges with military actions on both sides linked very closely to supporting the negotiating position of the respective delegations.[45]

At the strategic level, the distinct impression of the Korean War is one of the United States groping, unsure of exactly how to fight the war. MacArthur's confidence in the traditional approach found sympathy in those desiring to see a clear-cut victory over the communists. Unfortunately, limited wars that do not reach speedy resolution risk losing the one element of national power that Roosevelt had considered essential in executing strategic plans: popular support. The removal of MacArthur marked the zenith of the power of personality in strategic and campaign planning for the United States. Thereafter, compromise, committee planning without vision, and systems begin to dominate the U.S. approach to planning and prosecuting war. The NSC, having failed its first test, was increasingly overwelmed as it attempted to cope with burgeoning U.S. commitments.

The Vietnam War

Understanding the strategic problem facing the United States in Southeast Asia in the 1960s is essential to evaluating the linkage between policy, strategy, and campaigns during the Vietnam War. The United States had engineered a series of alliances around the Soviet/Red Chinese periphery. This alliance structure was the

physical expression of the U.S. policy of containment. NATO was now a mature alliance and U.S. strategic nuclear superiority guaranteed its security. The U.S. challenge was to defeat the communist backed and inspired wars of national liberation. President Kennedy articulated the policy when he said that the U.S. would go anywhere and pay any price in the defense of freedom.[46]

It was in this context that counterinsurgency doctrine was born. The struggle of the Republic of Vietnam, a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO), became the test case for the efficacy of the alliance system in containing communism as well as our counterinsurgency doctrine. In a global context, U.S. policy and prestige were at stake. Containing communism in South Vietnam was consistent with U.S. national policy; but the strategic problem, however, was that North Vietnam was the source of the insurgency. Consequently, strategic planning should have focused on linking policy, strategy, and campaigns to defeating North Vietnam. How the U.S. policymakers approached this problem determined the direction that military operations and planning would take.[47]

Although many histories of the Vietnam War divide events into pre- and post-Tet, the strategic planning issues are best examined in terms of personalities. In this context, there are two phases to the war: the Johnson/McNamara era and the Nixon/Kissinger era. Each approached the solution to the strategic problem differently.

Lyndon Johnson's forte was domestic politics and Congressional manipulation, while Robert McNamara was the business expert, a proponent of systems analysis. Johnson wanted to confine U.S. operations to battling the insurgency in South Vietnam, thereby minimizing the impact on his Great Society programs. McNamara introduced the Planning Program and Budgeting System (PPBS) into the

Defense Department as an analytical tool to control and justify defense budgets.[48] The impact of these two men and their biases on the conduct of the war was dramatic.

Johnson's views affected planning and prosecution of the war in six ways. First, he placed strict limitations on the geographic area for ground combat operations. The war would be fought within South Vietnam. It was, after all, an insurgency. Second and third, he decided not to call up reserves or seek a declaration of war. Fourth, he decided to focus popular support toward domestic reform rather than toward the war. Fifth, he saw attacks against North Vietnam as a means of reprisal rather than part of a campaign to cripple the North's war-waging capability. Finally, his attempts to narrow and confine the war led to strategic guidance couched in negative terms rather than terms conducive to a strategic concept and vision by which all the elements of national power could be focused.

McNamara's reliance on systems analysis, besides reinforcing the President's approach to the war, impacted on planning and execution in four ways. First, the forceful arguments of the systems analysts created a lack of credibility in the "experience based" arguments of the generals. Johnson turned to civilians for answers and rarely consulted with the military. Second, actions and plans were judged by their efficiency within the PPBS rather than upon their military effectiveness. This view led to the conclusion that violence could be measured so that the amount of military force necessary to achieve a desired result could be calculated with precision. Body counts as a way to measure progress was a tragic offshoot of this mentality. The fourth effect, a gradual, controlled escalation of force until the enemy reached his breaking point, stemmed directly from this conclusion.

The cumulative impact on the conduct of military operations was twofold. From the beginning U.S. forces were essentially limited to the tactical level of war. There was essentially no strategic plan upon which to design a campaign. Second, there was no direct connection between the air effort in the North with the ground operations in the South. Eventually, the Ho Chi Minh trail became a target, but only as one step along the path of gradual application of force. General Westmoreland has been accused of having a strategy of attrition, which is criticized as having no strategy at all.[49] But, within the limitations given him, he attempted to fill the void.

The Nixon/Kissinger phase of the war was different in that there was a strategy. The goal was to withdraw the U.S. from the war and leave a viable Vietnam capable of defending itself--essentially the goal all along. The difference is that military operations were designed to support the U.S. position in negotiating with the North Vietnamese. For example, bombing campaigns in the North were not stopped as a sign of good will but pursued until specific concessions were achieved. Furthermore, the bombing did not operate under the same level of restrictions. On the ground, the incursion into Cambodia demonstrated a different approach to the use of force. Unfortunately, these changes were in the context of U.S. withdrawal and even then were increasingly restrained by Congressional action.[50] The strategic problem was still North Vietnam. However, U.S. leadership decided to rely on a political solution to achieve the desired military security for South Vietnam, thus turning Clausewitz on his head. Politics had become the extension of war.

Authors, such as Harry Summers and Bruce Palmer, are wont to focus on what we should have done in Vietnam.[51] Summers keys on the theoretical aspects of strategy while Palmer focuses primarily on

practical issues of operations and tactics. As salient as their points are, they miss the point that personalities, not theories, are what went wrong in Vietnam. Hopefully, a better understanding of the theory would help mitigate against this problem; but it is incumbent upon the military to be able to identify the strategic problem, develop and recommend a strategy, and then implement it with a campaign plan that meets political restrictions.

ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING

Based on the foregoing survey of strategic planning and associated campaigns, several elements emerge as essential to successful strategic planning. The purpose of strategic planning is to ensure the linkage between policy, strategy, and campaign plans. History indicates that the presence of the following eight elements contribute to successful prosecution of war:

1. **Personality**--A strong willed leader with the capability to see with strategic vision and understand the use and integration of the elements of power can overcome weaknesses in other areas.

2. **Structure**--The national security structure or defense establishment must be able to provide either a corporate genius in the absence of the great leader, an apparatus conducive to the implementation of strategic vision by leaders, or an environment that helps produce great leaders by allowing the personalities with vision to rise to the top.

3. **Identifying the Strategic Problem**--Next to personality, this is the strongest lesson in the study of operational art. Campaigns are not

successful unless they contribute to solving the real strategic problem. Therefore, in the attempt to link policy, strategy, and campaigns, it is critical to identify correctly the strategic problem.

4. **Adopting a Strategy**--This element is important because it provides the framework for campaign plan development. The strategy should be developed in an atmosphere of unrestrained thought.

5. **Unified Military Doctrine**--The use of a unified military doctrine achieves two ends. First, it helps guide force design and force structure so that resources are not wasted on equipment and training that are not needed to accomplish strategic objectives. Second, it focuses efforts of the services on fulfilling their role in national military strategy rather than trying to develop a narrow, service specific concept.

6. **Integration of Elements of National Power**--This aspect is often forgotten when discussing military planning, but it is extremely important. This is especially true in planning for insurgency or limited war. For the U.S. prior to World War II, other elements of national power had to be developed and put into operation in peacetime if the military were to execute the war plan.

7. **Continuity**--It is important that a strategic plan be given the time to develop and evolve as events change. One way to accomplish this is to keep the leaders involved in planning in their positions for extended periods of time. Bismarck and Moltke and Roosevelt and Marshall are two examples of where this was important. Johnson and MacNamara had tremendous continuity, but it was continuity of the

absence of strategic vision.

8. **Campaign Plans Focus on the Strategic Problem**--Campaigns must contribute to solving the strategic problem. There may be some plans that attack the problem more directly than others; but political or resource restraints may counsel adopting a less direct approach. Roosevelt's decision to support TORCH is an example of this. As long as the plan addresses the strategic problem, its adoption is consistent with strategy.

These elements of successful strategic planning provide a basis for designing a national security structure for the U.S. that optimizes the integration of national power toward achieving the national strategy.

A MODIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION

After considering the elements isolated in the foregoing section, it appears that the current national security structure needs to be modified in at least three significant ways. First, there needs to be a means for integrating the elements of power on a regional basis. It was argued earlier that the current structure for strategic planning did not permit the effective integration of national power to implement strategy. In particular, the size of the NSC limits its ability to handle disparate regional requirements and integrate strategic planning. Although modern communications have "decreased" distance in time, it is a fallacy to assume that centralized decision- making and execution will be easier. In fact the NSC faces information and event overload. The British Empire, when faced with a communication problem, used a viceroy, who had authority over the implements of British power in an area, to execute a British policy(strategy).

A solution to the NSC's problem might be a structure at the national level similar to the unified commands. Regional Security Staffs(RSS) headed by Assistant National Security Advisors(ANSA) could function as the means for the NCA to ensure that security decisions for long term strategy and short term crises are effectively executed by bringing together all the appropriate elements of national power. The ANSA for a given region would have the "integrative" authority to cut across functional lines within his region to implement the decisions of the NCA (Figure 1 depicts generally how this fits into the existing structure, while Table 1 illustrates how the system would work in a hypothetical scenario. Appendix 1 list the regions and duties.). The ANSA and his RSS would have responsibility to formulate a regional strategy implementation and integration plan based on guidance from the NSC.

The second modification is to ensure improved continuity in key leadership position. The President, his Cabinet, and other appointed officials in the executive are limited to a maximum of eight years. Obviously some additional continuity is achieved if the same political party holds office more than two terms. In Congress, on the other hand, many representatives and senators have long term seniority. In the highest military positions, tenure is limited to four years in the case of the JCS. This limitation is not beneficial to the needs of long term planning and execution of military strategy in support of national policy. Moltke was in charge ten times as long. These officers should serve a minimum of six years on the JCS with the option to serve indefinitely at the pleasure of the President. Similar rules should apply to unified commanders.

The third modification of the structure is the role of a unified military doctrine and the authority of the CJCS to implement it. A

MODIFIED STRUCTURE FOR STRATEGY INTEGRATION



FIGURE 1

HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
FOR
REGIONAL SECURITY STAFF

	Integration Authority ANSA RSS	Strategic Vision National Command Authority	Functional Authority Departments and Agencies
CRISIS DEVELOPS	-ANSA directs RSS to update plans/gather information -RSS begins staff coordination with functional reps -ANSA contacts civ/mil leaders for region; embassay & unified cmd estimates to RSS -ANSA Estimate to NSC	-Insurgents in Philippines declare independent government -Philippine Government requests assistance -NSC convenes; SE Asia ANSA present -Confer with Congressional leadership -Guidance to ANSA and Depts/Agencies for COA Development	-Initial Military alert Actions -Gather information -DOS begins diplomatic action with UN/neighbor nations; initial assesments to NCA. -DOD/JCS advice to NCA; support to RSS
PLAN DEVELOPMENT	-ANSA gives regional guidance to RSS based on guidance from NCA -COAs developed/compared with Regional Strategy and Integration Plan(RSIP) -Ongoing coord with Gov't of Philippines -Recommend COA (modified RSIP as needed) to NCA	-Monitor situation -Updated guidance -Accepts/modify RSIP -Gain Congress support	-Provide assistance to ANSA/RSS as required -Functional plans developed -Additional resources/ forces provided as req'd
EXECUTION	-ANSA assumes full integration authority; becomes NCA executive agent to implement RSIP -ANSA directs operation -RSS monitors functional plans to ensure integration -Recommend changes to NCA	-Order execution of plan -Monitor execution/update guidance -Direct supervision of ANSA	-Observe int'l law -Domestic actions -JCS/DOD support CINC -Continue support to ANSA/RSS
CRISIS RESOLUTION	-ANSA ensures end state conforms to national obj -RSS prepares transition plan for future COA -RSIP update/revision -Post crisis normal integration authority resumes -Post crisis report to NCA/ Congress	-Assess result -Additional guidance for new operation or revision of RSIP -Post crisis evaluation of national strategy	-Post crisis followup evaluation -Normal Functional authority resumes

TABLE 1

unified military doctrine is imperative to focus the planning, force structure and design, and budget priorities of the services and Department of Defense. This doctrine may change over time as world conditions and national interests and objectives alter. But it is inimical to successful strategic planning for the services to develop budgets, plans, and forces based on different strategic concepts. Presently, the Navy views the world through a prism of maritime strategy. The Army has focused on continental landpower through forward basing to achieve containment, but is now struggling with the transition to a strategy that stresses LIC and rapid, as well as discriminate, deployment. The Air Force focuses on strategic nuclear deterrence despite its apparent acceptance of AirLand Battle as the basis for a joint operational doctrine.

Admittedly, the establishment of the J-7 was intended to provide solutions to the problems of joint interoperability. The question of joint or unified military doctrine is within it charter. A more fundamental approach must exist than focusing on equipment and procedures. For example, should the Navy have a separate nuclear deterrent, or should there be a strategic forces branch of service akin to the Soviets' Strategic Rocket Forces?

Unified doctrine must have the budgetary power to enforce changes. If a decision is made to effect a change in structure, the JCS and DOD must have the power to do so without fighting against service parochialism. Especially in a period of constrained budgets, defense expenditures must work toward common objectives. The capabilities of the services must be complementary (different capabilities that work together such as Air Force counterair and Army air defense) and supplementary (similar capabilities that reinforce each other such Army and Marine Corps ground combat units or naval gunfire, Army

artillery, and Air Force close air support) within the framework of a common strategy.

Having outlined the basic changes to the national security structure and the rationale behind them, we will now test the validity of this paradigm against the previously established criteria.

EVALUATING THE PARADIGM

Our examination of strategic planning has revealed elements that affect successful strategic planning. Unfortunately, the practice and integration of these elements appears to be absent from the security structure of the United States today. Although America's failure in Vietnam was a product of this egregious void, the thrust of changes today focus, ironically, on the military's ability to execute, not on the process and key elements of strategic planning.

The modifications proposed above are designed to address these deficiencies. Before examining the validity of this proposal against the established criteria, it is essential note that *no* structure is a guarantee since it must rely on persons of varying ability to execute. Nonetheless, it is the premise of the paradigm offered that the organization must facilitate the ability of strategic genius to plan and implement strategy. Great leaders can usually find a way to overcome the impediments of bureacracy and the inertia of tradition, but it is foolish to handicap the defense of our nation by forcing our leaders to overcome error at home before defeating the enemy abroad.

Does the structure address the problems and weaknesses identified? Using the elements identified above as a basis for evaluation, the proposal addresses all these elements. The Assistant National Security Advisor and the Regional Security Staff fill the void that exists in two ways. They serve to ensure that the strategic vision of

the NCA as expressed in strategic plans is adhered to by integrating all the elements of power into a regional security plan. Secondly, their expertise allows the NCA to gain an across-the-board view that will help in identifying the correct strategic problem and selecting the best strategy. Moreover, this modified approach recognizes that functional execution does not produce unity of effort. The consequences of such a process is evident in failed strategy from Napoleon to Hitler to the U.S. in Vietnam. The changes in the JCS improve the level of continuity in planning and execution as well as the authority to enforce change. Finally, a unified military doctrine provides a common focus for the services .

Does the structure have a reasonable chance of successfully redressing the problems identified? The measure of this criteria again lies in the historical examples. Based on the analysis above, the nations that most closely adhered to the elements highlighted were the most successful in devising strategic plans that linked policy, strategy, and campaigns. The base case is the success of German strategic planning between 1860 and 1890. Its success was all the more striking in contrast to the failure of military plans and diplomacy to mesh immediately prior to World War I. Roosevelt accomplished the same result but by improvisng an organization with key lieutenants in place that served to execute his strategic vision. The changes advocated above provide increased opportunity for strategic genius to develop and to flourish. It is reasonable to conclude that if the structure offered here does in fact meet the conditions of the preceding criteria then it should be successful.

Is the structure flexible enough to deal with changing military and political conditions across the spectrum of conflict? In general terms, any improvement in the integration of the elements of national

power will enhance the flexibility of the NCA. Specifically, the modifications presented improve flexibility because they address the need for regional application of power. The conditions in the regions of the world vary. For the same reason that the military does not rely on one unified command and one set of forces to react to every contingency, strategic planning and the concomitant integration of the elements of national power in a region are different. Looking across the spectrum of conflict, it is clearly beneficial to have the means already in place in peacetime to react to changing situations. Especially when confronted with LIC environments, the U.S. needs to integrate fully all elements and aspects of national power.

Moreover, because of the long term basis of some strategies, continuity in leadership is essential. Additionally, history reinforces the importance of the power of personality in shaping events. The proposed changes focus more on personality than on process. Processes can become rigid, the antithesis of flexibility. People exhibit the capacity to effect change despite the inertia of process.

A salient strength of the structure advocated in this paper is that by improving planning it should also have a salutory effect on budgeting and force structure. With clearer lines of "integrative" authority, duplication of effort should be reduced. Furthermore, this approach should give a more precise view of requirements so that sufficient force is available. Thereby, flexibility will be achieved through an unrestrained appro ch to strategic planning. This was the approach used by Bismarck and Moltke as well as Roosevelt and Marshall. Hitler, by contrast, planned campaigns in an unrestrained manner without the strategic planning to support them.

Finally, is the proposed structure politically acceptable? The

underlying assumption in developing this proposal was the need to be consistent with America's national values, the Constitution, and the political process. The changes argued herein require no change of the Constitution. They build upon the existing base of the relationship between the President, his National Security Advisor, and the NSC staff. However, ANSAs would have tremendous authority and influence in national security affairs and should significantly improve the ability of the President to implement policy. Initially, Congress might find this strengthening of the executive objectionable, but, ultimately, should recognize it as beneficial and acceptable. As a matter of political reality, the ANSAs should be confirmed by Congress and the RSS subject to some form of Congressional oversight. Nevertheless, the line of authority must be straight to the president with the right of direct access. The NSC or National Security Advisor should not be interposed because this might interrupt the flow necessary to facilitate execution of strategic vision, the strategic intent. The ANSA should be an ad hoc member of the NSC when conditions require his expertise. This role would further improve his understanding of the issues and the vision behind the strategy.

The changes in the JCS and the adoption of a unified military doctrine will probably be the most difficult aspects of the structure to implement. The parochial lobbies that exist both in and outside government have strong motivations in opposing changes to the existing structure. The rationales behind these interest groups are not necessarily unpatriotic or unfounded. It is not the intent of this paper to evaluate them, only to acknowledge their existence and potential impediment to change. However, the current trend in Congress is toward giving the JCS greater authority over the services; and this is a positive indicator that this aspect of the modified organization

can be adopted.

In summary, the structure provided addresses the lessons of history and satisfies the criteria proposed initially. Therefore, the proposal appears to be valid. This conclusion does not imply that there are no other solutions only that this paradigm is better than the current structure.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATION FOR U.S. STRATEGIC PLANNING

The preceding discussion of a modified national security structure has not been an idle academic exercise. The United States has demonstrated incompetence in its strategic planning ability since World War II. It is sobering to realize that despite the tempest over defense reform the central weakness of the national security structure, its reliance on "function" rather than "integration," has been bypassed in the stampede to "correct" the military.

The validity and gravity of this thesis is underscored by the current disarray that exists in U.S. strategy and the consequences this has on defense planning. There are at least five official or semi-official strategies being advocated for the United States. The first is simply a strategy of deterrence. Within this general concept is the reliance on nuclear deterrence as the centerpiece of U.S. military strategy. However, the continued importance and credibility of this strategy has increasingly been questioned. The shift from a doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response was but one symptom of its declining efficacy. Tied closely to this is the shock to the strategic framework caused by the INF treaty and the companion proposals for massive reductions or elimination of strategic nuclear missiles.[52]

A second strategy is that of competitive strategies, a concept

that can be called the "Weinberger doctrine." As Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger suggested that the United States focus its military competition with the Soviet Union in those areas that force the Soviets to make massive expenditures to counter minimum expenditures by the U.S.[53]

The maritime strategy is certainly not new but continues to be one of the principle alternatives suggested as a successor to NATO's vertical escalation strategy of flexible response. Its advocates contend that the ability to maneuver forces via seapower on a global scale around the periphery of the Soviet Union enhances deterrence by posing the Soviet planners with threats from several potential directions.[54] Significantly, maritime strategy is the guide by which the Navy plans its fleet size and structure. It is also the basis for its budgets.

A fourth strategy is that of "discriminate deterrence," the title of the report by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. The commission, while recognizing the continued key role of NATO in U.S. foreign policy and defense planning, points out the increasing need for the U.S. to act with appropriate speed and force on the periphery of the Soviet Union and in the Third World.[55] This strategy corresponds in large measure with maritime strategy but would, if adopted formally, signal an end to containment and a turn toward neo-isolationism.

Finally, the President's January 1988 "National Security Strategy of the United States" attempts to provide a framework that includes elements of the other strategies as well as sub-strategies for each region that are integrated into the broader strategy.[56] The approach has merit except that the mechanism to achieve the integration necessary does not exist.

The validity of any given strategy is not at issue at this point, but the existence of contending strategies has an adverse effect on defense in terms of the impact on planning, force structure and procurement, and budget and programs. The planner is faced with unclear policy objectives. Which strategy is the campaign plan supposed to be implementing? Does NATO, Southwest Asia, or Low-intensity conflict have priority? How does one plan based on the premise of escalation to nuclear weapons when theater systems are removed from the equation? The planners' dilemma is shared in the realm of force structure. What is the size of the armed forces? Do carrier battle groups, air wings or ground divisions have priority? Does the army have light divisions or heavy divisions and can one doctrine apply to both?

Perhaps the budget impact is the most dramatic of all. The economic conditions of the United States have dictated a reduction in defense spending. This is a political decision. However, the implementation of that decision by Secretary Carlucci has revealed a deep schism that cuts in two directions. On the one hand, the Defense Department has articulated a force design and structure based on an assessment of the threat. But when the services suddenly are directed to cut 10 per cent from the budget, what provides the basis for determining the priority of programs? Similarly, the Army has argued for a minimum number of divisions to accomplish its missions and sought to meet that number without an increase in end strength. However, certain brigades are being eliminated from the force structure and the end strength cut back. What determines which units are eliminated? Is it consistent with the national security requirements? Secretary of the Navy Webb's resignation because he believed the cuts directed by Carlucci hampered the Navy's ability to

execute the maritime strategy with the requisite 600 ships serves as an unambiguous statement of parochial and/or tangential results of multiple strategies.[57]

Such conditions demonstrate the need for a better structure and process than exist at present. The historical analysis conducted above reinforces the conclusion that to continue in the present manner dictates continued failure. There is a need to look at strategic planning afresh as the means to victory, and to avoid the stagnation that comes with merely peripheral changes.

The advent of nuclear weapons had a revolutionary impact on the way the U.S. military thought about warfighting. Bernard Brodie observed that the atomic age meant that armed forces would no longer exist to win wars but to prevent them.[58] Hence the emergence of deterrent strategy. But Brodie also lamented the demise of the influence of military opinion as civilian leadership turned increasingly to academicians to do strategic thinking and planning.

This condition was evident in the conduct of the Vietnam War. David Halberstam illustrated the arrogance that abounded in policy-making circles in his acclaimed work The Best and the Brightess.[58] The defense establishment in the United States has been struggling to recover ever since. Unfortunately, most of the solutions offered have focused on reforming the Pentagon. While reforms there have been necessary, as some still are, America's performance in Vietnam stemmed from a basic failure to devise a strategic plan that linked policy, strategy, and military campaigns.

The geostrategic problem, formerly a blessing, for the United States is that it is separated from its potential adversaries by major oceans. This condition, however, does not lead to a maritime strategy as the basis for a unified doctrine. Rather, to deal with this problem

the United States must be able to compete as a formidable continental land power with global reach. This requires forward basing, capable land combat power and, in some instances, an ability to conduct forced entry on a substantial scale (eg. corps or larger). Seapower is an important component in that it must maintain control of the sea lines of communication, but seapower alone cannot defeat land armies nor control or occupy continental territory. Consequently, NATO remains central to this strategy because it is one place where the United States already has access in substantial force to the Eurasian land mass. It also represents the most direct and most sustainable route to confront Soviet ground forces. To adopt another strategy would signal a return to isolationism. The probable effect on military capability would be to so increase the cost of American intervention at points of vital interest as to preclude U.S. reaction in either a timely or requisite manner.

Today, the United States is in the midst of rethinking its global role and strategy. Dangerously, the thought once again centers on reforming the military and restructuring its forces as the solution. The position advocated in this paper is that a more fundamental approach to change is necessary. Budgets, force structure and procurement, and planning must be guided by strategic vision. The move toward retrenchment in the face of constrained budgets is a symptom of the malaise that exists in our approach to strategic thought. In the end, America's defense structure must provide planning that maintains its global position in spite of budgetary contraints. Unrestrained thought should be the basis of our strategic planning. This will permit the leadership to apply the elements of national power to America's best interest.

APPENDIX ONE

Responsibilities of a Assistant National Security Advisor

--Act as area expert advisor to the President for his assigned region.

--Sit as a member of the NSC when directed by the President

--Supervise the Regional Security Staff

--Develop Regional Security Plan for integration of elements of power in consonance with national strategy and policy objectives.

--Act as President's executive agent for integrating elements of power in a region.

--Provide input for strategy formulation and strategic planning.

--Coodinate with governmental agencies and departments and other ANSAs as necessary.

--Provide region-specific budgetary recommendations to the President and/or Congress as directed.

Responsibilities of the Regional Security Staff

--Support the ANSA for the region in fulfilling his responsibilities.

--Coordinate with the NSC staff

--Coordinate with DoD, State, Treasury, etc. representatives in region and other RSSs as necessary.

--Monitor the implementation of programs in the region for conformance to national strategy and the regional security plan.

--Provide support to DoD, State, etc as directed by ANSA.

--Develop budgetary support information as necessary.

--Staff the Regional Security Plan.

Regions to have ANSAs and RSSs

The ANSAs and RSSs will correspond to the current regional unified military commands with two exceptions. There will be a sub-Saharan Africa region and Indian Ocean region. The latter will include all area east of Africa and CENTCOM and south of China to include the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

ENDNOTES

[1] See FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 1986) for the Army's doctrinal incorporation of operational art. There have been a flurry of articles that have appeared on the theme but particularly noteworthy is A New Day for Operational Art, Army (March, 1985): 22-28 and 32 by LTC L. D. Holder, reprinted in ST 101-4, The Operational Environment, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1986), pp. 4-206 to 4-213. LTC Holder was one of the principal authors of FM 100-5.

[2] There are several sources to examine to follow this development. A key initial book was Richard A Gabriel and Paul L. Savage's Crisis in Command: Mismangement in the Army (1978). A good compilation is Asa Clark, ed., The Defense Reform Debate, (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984. Probably the most provocative book is Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War: the Question of Military Reform, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). A critique of U.S. military operations from Son Tay through Grenada along with suggestive reforms of the officer corps is found in Richard A Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985). Also a more media oriented view is Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces, (New York: Random House, 1986). The government has contributed to the literature as well in the form of the Packard Commission and the hearings surrounding the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Bill.

[3] See John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984).

[4] Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1982), pp. 3-4. An examination of FM 100-5 clearly reveals Clausewitz' influence. Also Clausewitz figures prominently in the curriculum at the U.S. Army's School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth.

[5] See footnote 2 above.

[6] The central and most controversial aspect of the bill is the requirement for three and one-half years of continuous "joint" duty for an officer to be considered for promotion to general officer rank. Other aspects were focused on restructuring the JCS to include raising the status of the Chairman and adding a Vice Chief. A third priority was the increase in joint education curriculum in service schools.

[7] Summers, Strategy, p. 1.

[8] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) pp. 78-81.

[8]See Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, August 1984).

[10]The historical survey is deliberately limited to Western examples. This decision does not reflect a conclusion that Marxist-Leninist or Maoist views of strategic planning would present different elements. In fact, they would reinforce the points made later in the paper. However, the difference in political structure permits solutions not readily adaptable or acceptable in democracy. These criteria are built upon a model used by Keith Dunn and William Staudenmaier in "The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities for NATO," Survival 27 (May/June 1985): 108-117. The model was appropriate for use in this context but beyond that the article is not directly pertinent to the discussion here.

[11]See Robert Epstein, The Practice and Evolution of Operational Art, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 87/88), p. 4-2/3-3.

[12]Napoleon battlefield victories bought France temporary peace. Napoleon, despite his efforts to build an empire ruled by his family, never attempted to eliminate the Hapsburgs or the Romanovs. Consequently, Britain was always able to regenerate an alliance. Napoleon either had to defeat Britain or ensure that Britain could have no continental ally to provide the manpower Britain lacked. He never devised a strategy to do both, although he came close to the right idea with the Continental System.

[13]Robert M. Epstein, The Different Levels of War in the Napoleonic Period--Austerlitz and Friedland, School of Advanced Military Studies Course Reading, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, AY 87/88), p. 11.

[14]David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1966), p. 745. After Tilsit, Alexander had agreed to enter an alliance against Britain as well as enter the Continental System. Over the next several years, Alexander began to exercise his perogatives as an equal to Napoleon thereby earning the Emperor's increasing wrath. The breaking of the Continental System proved the final straw for Napoleon.

[15]Good discussions of these problems are found in Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, (New Haven, CT: Ticknor & Fields, 1985); and Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984). Lee's great dilemma was that even if he defeated the Army of the Potomac, his army would not be strong enough to occupy the North or even to

take Washington, D.C. He was forced to rely on political events such as British intervention to bring the strategic victory he desired.

[16]My paper, "German Strategic Planning, 1858-1914," unpublished seminar paper, January 1978, covers the development of diplomatic and military plans in some detail. Some of what follows is a further refinement of the ideas advanced there.

[17]T. N. Dupuy, A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, (Toronto, Canada: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 117.

[18]Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 277.

[19]Ibid., p. 268.

[20]Dupuy, p. 126.

[21]During this period, the power of the Social Democrats continued to increase. They brought the military budgets under increasing scrutiny. Bismarck responded by having the funding made for five-year periods. Inevitably, the government had to come back before the end of the period seeking additional funds and increases in manpower because of the rising tensions or improvements in the potential enemies.

[22]It is well known that Moltke directed that two corps be withdrawn and sent to East Prussia because the Russians had mobilized faster than expected. These two corps were thus absent from the Battle of the Marne and never made it to East Prussia in time to help defeat the Russians at Tannenburg. If additional corps had been fielded, they could have been used to bolster the army in East Prussia without reducing the force ratios in the west.

[23]The Eastern mobilization plan, the Grosse Ostaufmarsch, was discontinued completely in 1913.

[24]As the story goes, the Kaiser raised the issue of mobilizing only against Russia in order to preclude a French declaration of war and/or mobilization. With the mobilization against France already under way based on meticulous timetables, Moltke broke into tears claiming it could not be done. The Kaiser is supposed to have responed, "Your uncle would have given me a different answer!"

[25]Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982) gives several examples of the disagreement between himself and Hitler especially on the conduct of campaigns. Hitler's mistrust of his generals stemmed initally from their resistance to his plans which proved successful. Later, after the assassination attempt, their opinion counted for even less.

[28]Also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Hitler barely managed to get the agreement before Germany invaded Poland. Fortunately for Hitler, Poland's refusal to allow Soviet troops to cross Polish territory to defend Czechoslovakia in 1938 had led to the fall of the latter country and left Poland outflanked to the south.

[27]The defeat of France in 1940 was the last campaign of Nazi Germany that had a link to a strategic vision. Thereafter, Germany never was able to seen a campaign through to a conclusion. Robert Doughty in Seeds of Disaster, (Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press, 1985) gives a good view of how France had the correct strategic vision but choose the wrong tactics and operational doctrine. The Germans had all three correct. But Britain was still in the war, and Hitler faced the same decision that confronted Napoleon. He had defeated France but had not prepared to defeat Britain. And as Napoleon was drawn to Ulm and Austerlitz (abandoning his invasion of Britain), Hitler decided to turn east before Britain was occupied or defeated at sea. Consequently, Bismarck's bane, a two-front war, was a deliberate choice. Manstein adequately recounts the result of campaigns pursued without strategic vision. Nor does it stop there. Rommel's campaigns in North Africa added yet another theater to dissipate German strength. Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986) presents the North African campaigns of both sides in excellent contrast.

[28]There were deliberate decisions made to concentrate production of fighters and dive bombers. There were some medium bombers like the He-111 but no bombers capable of strategic distances and heavy loads. Thus, Germany was never able to attack Soviet industry east of the Urals or British bases near Alexandria.

[29]Initially, the ground force mission resided with the German Army. However, Himmler did not want his SS to be left out the war and confined merely to incinerating Jews. He saw SS combat units as a means to aggrandize his power against Goering and others. As the glory of the Luftwaffe began to wane along with its successes, Goering saw the commitment of Luftwaffe ground divisions as a way to regain some favor as well as influence on how the war proceeded. On top of this competition were problems associated with equipment. For example, the vacillation on whether to build assault guns or tanks, besides slowing down assembly lines and reducing numbers produced, reflected a problem of tanks versus artillery. Although the assault guns were supposed to be a cheaper way to kill tanks, they were under the artillery branch and that reduced the importance of the armor. Nor does this address the problems presented by the split between OKW and OKH.

[30]The treaty set the ratio for the U.S., Britain, Japan, France, and Italy at 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 respectively. See Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense:

A Military History of the United States, (New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp. 363-365 for a discussion of the naval concerns; see Chapter 12 for overall military policy during the interwar years.

[31] Ibid., Chapter 12. George C. Marshall is central among these figures.

[32] Excellent summations of these plans are found in James J. Schneider, "War Plan Rainbow 5," Unpublished monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Novemer 1987) and in Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in Command Decisions, Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1960/1984), pp. 11-48.

[33] Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987), p. 16.

[34] Schneider, p. 9.

[35] Morton, p. 40.

[36] This is a subject of great controversy. A reasonably objective view is Leo J. Meyer, "The Decision to Invade North Africa (TORCH)," in Command Decisions, pp. 173-198. Larrabee suggests that Roosevelt's strategic vision was such that he realized it was vital to get America into the European war quickly for political reasons (p. 9). Two contrasting views are argued by Richard W. Steele's The First Offensive, 1942: Roosevelt, Marshall, and the Making of American Strategy, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973) and Mark A Stoler's The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977). The former attacks Marshall for giving Roosevelt bad military advice concerning the early cross-channel invasion while the latter points out the strategic wisdom of going into North Africa in terms of coalition cohesion.

[37] Stoler, p. 6-9.

[38] Larrabee, pp. 12, 305, 307-308.

[39] Ibid., pp. 3-6.

[40] General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 23-24.

[41] R. Gordon Hoxie, Command Decision and the Presidency: A Study of National Security Policy and Organization, (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 83.

[42] D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. III: 1945-1964, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), p. 426.

[43] Ibid., pp. 443-444, 464-474.

[44] Ibid., p. 530.

[45] Ridgway, pp. 168-170. These pages cite Ridgway's General Order to Van Fleet after taking over from MacArthur.

[46] President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, January 20, 1961 reproduced in Representative American Speeches: 1960-1961, ed. by Lester Thonssen, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 36-39.

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

"To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny."

"Now the trumpet summons us again--not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, --not as a call to battle, though embattled we are--but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, 'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation'--a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself."

[47] Summers' book is the most theoretical view of the problem. However, General Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984) and General Dave Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978) give good histories of the war while discussing the impact of policy decisions on the conduct of the war. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightess, (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1973) was a very early attempt while the war was ongoing to look at the Kennedy/Johnson administrations and how policy was approached. A recent offering is Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) which argues that the Army tried to fight an insurgency with a conventional force structure and poor command and control. He contends the Army let the U.S. government down.

[48] The best study on this is Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978.

[49] Bruce Palmer, p. 178.

[50] Ibid., p. 109. In December 1970, Congress reacted to the Cambodian incursion by prohibiting the spending of any funds for the operation of U.S. ground troops outside Vietnam. Fortunately, airpower was still relatively unrestrained until the last NVA offensive in 1975. In the wake of the war, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in attempt to reassert its authority over declaration of war by trying to prohibit the President from using U.S. forces in combat with expressed Congressional support. Robert F.

Turner covers this development well in The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983).

[51] Most of the arguments offered want to change the restrictions imposed by the government. Bruce Palmer comes closest to offering a way to fight within the political constraints. Harry Summers, although concerned with the Army's performance, really highlights the void that existed in our approach to the integration of the elements of national power. Krepinevich's argument misses the strategic problem that was North Vietnam.

[52] The U.S. strategy has rested upon nuclear deterrence in one form or another since the mid-1950s. The concept of extended deterrence to our allies is the central feature of NATO MC 14/3, the Flexible Response Doctrine. However, the rush to nuclear reductions destroys that concept without a new strategy and force structure being advocated in its place.

[53] Secretary of Defense Weinberger articulated this concept in "Our National Security Strategy," Defense (March/April 1987): 6. Also see for discussion John Englund, "The Doctrine of Competitive Strategies," Strategic Review (Summer 1987): 63-73.

[54] One of the more balanced presentations of this concept is Colin S. Gray, Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West, (New York: Ramapo Press, 1986. An official Navy view is found in Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," from Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute, January 1983. A criticism of the strategy is found in John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 3-57.

[55] Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy: Discriminate Deterrence, Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, co-chairmen. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1988).

[56] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1988).

[57] Webb resigned on February 23, 1988 citing Secretary of Defense Carlucci's lack of leadership and the undercutting of the 600-ship navy upon which maritime strategy was based.

[58] This thesis was first advanced in Brodie's The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946).

[59] See footnote 47 above.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Documents, Manuals, and Reports

AFSC Pub 1. Joint Staff Officer's Guide. Washington, D.C.: Armed Forces Staff College, 1 July 1986; Change 1, 21 October 1987.

Craft, LTC Douglas W. "Operational Art in the Western Desert, 1940-43." School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1987.

Crowe, Admiral William J. "Turning Warriors Into Strategists." Defense Issues, Vol. 1, No. 49.

Department of Defense. "To Provide For The Common Defense." Defense (March/April): 11-36.

Epstein, Robert M. The Different Levels of War in the Napoleonic Period--Austerlitz and Friedland. School of Advanced Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, AY 87/88.

_____. The Practice and Evolution of Operational Art. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 87/88.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, May 1986.

Field Manual (FM) 100-6. Large Unit Operations. Coordinating Draft. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 30 September 1987.

Final Report by the President's Blue Ribbon Commisssion on Defense Management: A Quest for Excellence. David Packard, chairman. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1986.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts, ed. Command Decisions. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1960/1984.

House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Centurey Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, August, 1984.

JCS Pub 2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 1974; Change 1, 1 December 1975; Change 2, 7 March 1979; Change 3, 15 January 1984; Change 4, 1 December 1984.

NSC-68. "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security." Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, April 14, 1950.

NSC-162/2. "Basic National Security Policy." Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, October 30, 1953.

Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy: Discriminate Deterrence. Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, co-chairmen. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, January 1988.

Romjue, John L. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982. Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984.

Schnabel, James F. Policy and Direction: The First Year. United States Army in the Korean War Series. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1972.

ST 101-4. Operational Environment. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 August 1986.

The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1988.

U.S Congress. House. Representative Skelton on Military Strategy, 6 October 1987, Congressional Record H 8234. Rep. Skelton on Strategy and Military Education, 26 October 1987, Congressional Record H 8967. Rep Skelton on Strategy and Officer Education, 29 October 1987, Congressional Record H 9144.

Weinberger, Casper W. "Our National Security Strategy." Defense (March/April 87): 5-9.

_____. Strategy! The Driving Force Behind the Defense Budget." Defense (March/April): 2-4.

Books and Monographs

Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth N., ed. The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy. New York, NY; London, England: University Press of America, 1983.

Barnett, Correlli. The Desert Generals. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982.

Brisson, Douglas D. "German Strategic Planning, 1858-1914." Unpublished Seminar Paper, January 1978.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959, 1965.

_____, ed. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946,

Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1966.

Cimbala, Stephen J. and Dunn, Keith A., ed. Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Cercion, Persuasion, and War. Boulder, CO; London, England: Westview Press, 1987.

Clark, Asa A., IV, et al., ed. The Defense Reform Debate. Baltimore, MD; London, England: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984.

Collins, John M. U.S. Defense Planning, A Critique. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.

Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945. New York, NY; London and Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1955.

Deitchman, Seymour J. Limited War and American Defense Policy. Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1964.

Doughty, Robert Allen. The Seeds of Disaster: Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939. Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press, Inc.; Archon Book, 1985.

Dupuy, T. N. A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945. Toronto, Canada: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Earle, Edward Mead, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Maciavelli to Hitler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943

Gabriel, Richard A. Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1985.

Gabriel, Richard A. and Savage, Paul L. Crisis in Command: Mismangement in the Army. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1978.

Gray, Colin S. Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West. New York, NY: Ramapo Press, 1986.

_____. Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning. Phiadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984.

_____. The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution. New York, NY: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1977.

Hadley, Arthur T. The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces. New York, NY: Random House, 1986.

Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1973; New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 1972.

Hoxie, R. Gordon. Command Decision and the Presidency: A Study of National Security Policy and Organization. New York, NY: Reader's Digest Press, 1977.

_____, ed. The Presidency and National Security Policy. Proceedings, Vol. V, No. 1. New York, NY: The Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984.

James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur. Vol. III: 1945-1964. Boston, MS: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000. New York, NY: Random House, 1987.

Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston, MS; Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986

Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987.

Luttwak, Edward N. On the Meaning of Victory. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

_____. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987.

_____. The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1985.

Manstein, Field Marshal Eric von. Lost Victories. First Published as "Verlorene Siege" in 1955 by Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn. English translation 1958 by Methuen & Co., Ltd. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982.

Margiotta, Franklin D., ed. Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for U.S. Policymakers. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1980.

Martin, Laurence, ed. Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

Millet, Allan R. and Maslowski Peter. For The Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1984.

Osgood, Robert E. Containment, Soviet Behavior, and Grand Strategy. Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 16. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1981.

Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984.

Palmer, General Dave Richard. Summons of the Trumpet: A History of the Vietnam War From a Military Man's Viewpoint. New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1984; Presidio Press, 1978.

Palmer, Gregory. The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968. Westport, Conn.; London, England: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942. Fourth Edition. New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1986.

Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Ithaca, NY; London, England: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Record, Jeffrey. Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends. New York, NY: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984.

Ridgway, General Matthew B. The Korean War. New York, NY: The Popular Library; Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967.

Schneider, James J. "War Plan Rainbow 5." Unpublished Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, November 1987.

Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. New Haven, CT: Ticknor and Fields, 1985.

Snyder, Jack. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. Ithaca, NY; London, England: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Steele, Richard W. The First Offensive, 1942: Roosevelt, Marshall, and the Making of American Strategy. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973.

Stoler, Mark A. The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1982.

Taylor, A. J. P. Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1955.

Thonssen, Lester, ed. Representative American Speeches: 1960-1961. Vol. 33, No. 3, pp 36-39.

Turner, Robert F. The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice. Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983.

Young, Roland. Congressional Politics in the Second World War. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1956.

Articles and Newspapers

Brooks, Linton F. "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy." International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 58-88.

Dunn, Keith and Staudenmaier, William O. "Strategy for Survival." Foreign Policy (Fall 1983): 22-41.

Englund, John. "The Doctrine of Competitive Strategies. " Strategic Review (Summer 1987): 63-73.

Friedberg, Aaron L. "A History of the U.S. Strategic Doctrine, 1945-1980." The Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (December 1980): 37-71.

Gray, Colin S. and Barlow Jeffrey G. "Inexcusable Restraint: The Decline of American Military Power in the 1970s." International Security 10 (Fall 1985): 27-69.

Gray, Colin S. "National Style in Strategy: The American Example." International Security 6 (Fall 1981): 21-47.

Howard, Michael. "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy." Foreign Affairs (Summer 1979): 7-18.

Komer, Robert W. "What Decade of Neglect ?" International Security 10 (Fall 1985): 70-83.

Korb, Lawrence J. "Spending Without Strategy: The FY 1988 Annual Defense Department Report." International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 166-174.

Laird, Melvin R. "A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade: Defense Policy in the NIxon-Ford Years." International Security 10 (Fall 1985): 5-26.

Luttwak, Edward N. "An Emerging Postnuclear Era?" The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1988): 5-15.

Mearsheimer, John J. "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe." International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 3-57.

Posen, Barry R. and Van Evera, Stephen. "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment." International Security 8 (Summer 1983): 3-45.

Snyder, William P. "Making U.S. National Security Policies. Strategic Studies: National Security Policy Considerations, Course P512, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, AY 86/87.

Staudenmaier, William O. "Strategic Concepts for the 1980s-Part I." Military Review (March 1982): 36-50.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Search for a Science of Strategy." International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 140-165.

Watkins, Admiral James D. "The Maritime Strategy." from The Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute, January 1983.

Winn, Stephen E, "A New Strategy Features Old Mistakes," Kansas City Star, 25 October 1987, p. 1F.

END

DATE

FILMED

8-88

DTIC